I. Introduction
If the PICC apply to a contract, it is not because of any proper authority inherent to their adoption but because of an authority that derives from some law that allows their choice and thus their application. 58 This lack of original legislative authority implies that mandatory rules enacted by a jurisdiction with sovereign powers may prevail for certain questions. Art 1.4 recognizes this subordination, which means that the parties or an arbitral tribunal, by choosing the PICC to apply to the contract, cannot avoid the application of a number of mandatory rules that would apply also in the absence of this choice. Art 1.4 mentions that these mandatory rules may have different origins. 59 They are of purely national origin when enacted as autonomous national legislation of a state. They are of international origin if concluded as part of an international convention that is ratifi ed by the signatory states and then implemented in their national legal orders. Or they are of supranational origin if adopted by some supranational entity with own jurisdictional powers, such as the European Community or the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Art 1.4 indicates that the mandatory rules that must be respected are those 'applicable in accordance with the relevant rules of private international law'-which is not much more than a warning that there might be 'something out there'. This vagueness refl ects the fact that the determination of whether a rule is mandatory in a certain situation is most delicate and controversial in the context both of confl ict of laws and in the context of arbitration.
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In view of this complexity, only some rough guidelines can be given in the following. 58 See above, Preamble I paras 30-34 and Preamble II paras 2-4. 59 See also Off Cmt 1 to Art 1.4, p 12. 60 For an example of the unease of classic private international law doctrine with rules that defi ne their own scope of application and may impose themselves as mandatory independent of any bilateral confl ict of laws rules see S Francq, 'The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
II. Types of mandatory rules that may prevail
Rules have to be taken into consideration as mandatory if they explicitly or implicitly claim to apply to a given situation. Mandatory rules are legislative tools for implementing public policy. They impose a specifi c solution, or a specifi c method of determining a solution for a given situation in which public interests are at stake. These public interests are the protection of weak parties such as consumers or commercial agents; the protection of third parties that may be affected by the contract, such as creditors of one of the parties, lessees or distributors; or the protection of 'diffuse' public interests like undistorted competition, the transparency of certain markets, the effi ciency of the judiciary, the environment, public security, or effective tax collection. Mandatory rules are the exceptions that prove-or rather give legitimacy to-the rule of individual freedom of contract. As a consequence, the parties cannot agree on a solution different from that imposed by a mandatory rule, ie they cannot derogate from it. 61 There are two types of mandatory rules and their application depends on the legal basis for the application of the PICC.
Domestic mandatory rules
If a contract is subject to the law of a country, it is automatically also subject to all of its mandatory rules that implement this country's public policy. 62 This general framework for the freedom of contract remains applicable if the PICC apply to the contract by mere incorporation as pre-drafted contract clauses, like the INCOTERMS or the ICC Rules of Arbitration. Such a limited application of the PICC may indicate that the parties wanted rules of the PICC to complement a national law. But even if the parties want the PICC fully to govern their contract as the 'applicable law', such a choice of law in favour of non-state rules may be excluded by the law at the place of the arbitration or by the confl ict of laws rules of the court confronted with the contract. In that case, the PICC are reduced to mere contractual clauses subject to all mandatory rules of the applicable national law. For example, if the laws of New York govern the contract, a number of provisions of the PICC, depending on the circumstances, may not apply because they are incompatible with common law mandatory rules, 63 such as Art Of the mandatory rules of the court's home law (the lex fori) not all are designed to apply to an international situation. A specifi c result is usually only intended for the territory over which the sovereign has jurisdiction. So if the consequences or effects of a contract unfold outside that jurisdiction, then there rarely is a legitimate interest in seeing the mandatory rules of the lex fori apply extra-territorially. However, even if a contract potentially has an impact within the jurisdiction, the fact that it is international may cause domestic public policy considerations to be considerably attenuated. 68 This is especially the case if the contract is governed by a foreign law, either because the parties have chosen it or because the confl ict of laws rules of the court designate it as the proper law of the contract (the lex contractus). The applicable foreign law comes with its own public policy framework, 69 so that a priori the domestic mandatory rules of the lex fori have no reason to claim application. However, some mandatory rules of the lex fori represent such a strong public policy that the judge is obliged to enforce them irrespective of what solution is provided by the lex contractus. Only the result, or the method for determining the result, as defi ned by the lex fori is then acceptable in that country. Such strong mandatory rules are called internationally mandatory rules or lois d'application nécessaire, rules that impose a specifi c solution for a given situation independent of any choice of law considerations. 70 Internationally mandatory rules are the anticipation and concretization of the diffuse ordre public or public policy exception, which excludes the application of foreign law in those cases in which it is unacceptable because repugnant to the fundamental values of justice of the country in which the foreign law is to have effect.
Also the PICC come with their own little framework of public policy, 71 which applies if the PICC are chosen as the lex contractus either by the parties or-in case of default-by the court or arbitral tribunal in accordance with its respective confl ict of laws rules. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the law of the country in which a contract is to have effect will only accept this effect if a solution prevails that is different from that allowed under the PICC. For example, the PICC, and their 'own' public policy specifi ed in Art 3.10, will not limit the duration of an exclusivity agreement in a distributorship contract unless the duration of this exclusivity amounts to an 'unjustifi able excessive advantage' for one party; the public policy of the PICC only polices against 'gross disparity' in the equilibrium between the parties. National or supranational competition laws police against the distortion of competition and may impose shorter limits to the duration of exclusivity agreements for the sake of avoiding the foreclosure of a market through a bundle or network of similar contracts. 72 According to Art 1.4, these competition rules will then prevail as internationally mandatory rules over the solution allowed by the PICC
77 The impact of the need for such authorizations is treated by Arts 6.1.14-6.1.17.
(b) Anticipating internationally mandatory rules in negotiations. Parties negotiating and drafting a contract must be conscious of, and anticipate, the possible impact of internationally mandatory rules so as to avoid bad surprises. Art 1.4 provides little help for this anticipation as it only warns of mandatory rules 'which are applicable in accordance with the relevant rules of private international law'. This is not self-evident, precisely because internationally mandatory rules by defi nition apply irrespective of any classic confl ict of laws considerations. In essence, the parties have to, and in most cases instinctively will, look at the laws at the places where the contract is to unfold its effect, since mandatory rules in most cases are concerned with obtaining specifi c results within a given territory. If a Californian high-tech producer wants its products to be sold in Europe by commercial agents, it must be aware that European law-different from Californian law-guarantees 'it is essential for the Community legal order that a principal established in a non-member country, whose commercial agent carries on his activity within the Community, cannot evade those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice-of-law clause. The purpose served by the provisions in question requires that they be applied . . . irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed'. 74 
Art 1.4
Chapter 1: General provisions commercial agents an indemnity in case of termination of the agency contract, 78 and that European courts will ensure that such indemnity is granted irrespective of the law chosen by the parties (even if the contract-according to the Californian model-does not provide for a post-contractual non-compete obligation).
79 If a French fashion designer wants its creations to be sold in California by commercial agents, it must be aware that Californian law-different from European law 80 -guarantees fi red agents freedom from any contractual restrictions to exercise their professional activity in California, 81 and that Californian courts will strike down post-contractual non-compete obligations irrespective of the law chosen by the parties (even if the contract-according to the European model-provides for an indemnity in case of termination).
82 Furthermore, parties must be aware that their choice of a place of arbitration may also lead to the application of the mandatory laws of that country (see para 11 below).
(c) Coping with internationally mandatory rules in litigation.
If the parties agreed on having the PICC govern their contract as the lex contractus, and if a subsequent dispute on the existence or validity of certain contractual rights leads to litigation, the precise determination of the national laws that are mandatory for the parties in the specifi c case becomes an issue. The answer is different according to whether the dispute leads to litigation in a state court or before an arbitral tribunal.
(1) Internationally mandatory rules in a state court. In the-still rather hypotheticalcase in which a state court were to recognize the choice of the PICC as a genuine choice of law, 83 the court would simply look to its own lex fori and its internationally mandatory rules that may not be circumvented by the choice of the PICC. This results from the court's constitutional obligation not to lend its jurisdictional powers to any acts that could affect fundamental public policies within its jurisdiction. Circumstances may be such that the court may also want to take into consideration internationally mandatory rules of a third legal order, such as the laws of a country in which the judgment is most likely to be enforced. However, it derives from the sovereign autonomy of the state that there can be no such obligation, 84 unless accepted in a specifi c international treaty. 83 Under the overwhelming majority of national confl ict of laws rules, the choice of the PICC that is not coupled with a valid arbitration agreement will only qualify as a mere incorporation of the PICC as contract clauses, see above, Preamble I paras 33 and 50, and therefore does not affect the application of the applicable law and its mandatory rules, see para 4 above. 84 See eg Art 7(1) Rome Convention: 'When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close 8 9
Chapter 1: General provisions Art 1.4
(2) Internationally mandatory rules before an arbitral tribunal. The question of whether and which mandatory rules other than those of the lex contractus have to be taken into consideration is much more complex for an arbitral tribunal than for state courts-and hotly disputed among academics. Arbitral tribunals do not have a lex fori and their jurisdictional powers do not derive from a constitution. However, the source of arbitral jurisdiction provides some rough guidelines. Arbitral jurisdiction has its source in the agreement between the parties to submit themselves and their dispute to the decision of an arbitral tribunal. This leads to a contract by which the arbitrators obligate themselves towards the parties to render an arbitral award in accordance with the arbitration agreement. By accepting their appointment and thus arbitral jurisdiction, the arbitrators assume an obligation of best efforts to render an award that is effective in the sense of turning the dispute into res iudicata so as to exclude any future dispute on the same matter and in the sense of being enforceable so as to give effect to the remedies awarded to the winning party. 85 It follows from these two elements that the arbitral tribunal must make every reasonable effort to put its award on solid legal bases so as not to expose it to the risk of being annulled or to the risk of being unenforceable.
First, the arbitral tribunal, when applying the PICC as the lex contractus, may need to take into consideration the internationally mandatory rules of the law at the place of arbitration, the lex arbitrii, which is usually the law which controls the possibility of requesting the annulment of the award.
86 However, the place of arbitration is frequently chosen as a neutral place so that the contract and the award do not unfold their effect in that country. Therefore, they often do not fall within the scope of the mandatory rules of the lex arbitrii, which usually have no interest in imposing their solution on exclusively foreign situations. Swiss competition rules need not be taken into consideration by an arbitral tribunal if the contract between a French and an Italian party only unfolds its anti-competitive effect on the Italian market.
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Second, the arbitral tribunal-for the sake of respecting its obligation of best efforts to render an enforceable award-should always take into consideration the internationally mandatory rules of the countries in which enforcement of the arbitral award is likely to be sought. State courts that are requested to grant leave for enforcement or exequatur to an connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.' Chapter 1: General provisions arbitral award will test the award against their own public policy. 88 Accordingly, they may refuse enforcement if the combined choice of the PICC and arbitration leads to a circumvention of the internationally mandatory rules of the forum. The degree of control under the public policy exception to enforcement varies signifi cantly in different jurisdictions. Courts in some countries, like Germany and the USA, uphold a more or less detailed review of awards that are potentially contrary to their own internationally mandatory rules.
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In other countries, in particular France, courts cultivate a strong pro-arbitration bias and only refuse enforcement where there is a 'blatant' violation of their own internationally mandatory rules.
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In view of the somewhat opaque veil that the rules on the review of arbitral awards spin around internationally mandatory rules at the stages of setting aside and of enforcement, it has been suggested that these rules have become merely 'semi-mandatory'. 91 Others even claim that arbitration should be interpreted as excluding the relevance of national mandatory laws al together. 92 Yet others warn that arbitration simply leads to lawlessness. 93 Be that as it may, state courts will always remain bound to their constitution and thus to-at least the core of-their public policy. If courts accept delicate subject-matters covered by mandatory rules as being capable of settlement by arbitration (instead of simply refusing enforcement due to lack of arbitrability, which was the traditional solution), this liberty can only prevail if there is suffi cient certainty that at least those mandatory rules that refl ect a strong public policy will be respected by the arbitral tribunal.
94 Arbitral tribunals should be fully conscious that they do not have a jester's licence and that it is in their own best interest (in terms of reputation) and in the best interest of arbitration at large that they take their obligation of best efforts to render an irreproachable and enforceable award seriously by respecting those internationally mandatory rules that claim application to their case.
Arbitral tribunals may well fi nd that an internationally mandatory rule does not want to apply to their specifi c situation, or that its conditions are simply not met. 96 But for reaching that fi nding, they should respect the interpretations given to that rule by courts of the rule's country of origin.
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In summary, arbitrators will do well in taking into consideration those mandatory rules mentioned above, or at least those pleaded by one party during arbitral proceedings, 98 so as to avoid the risk of annulment or refused enforcement and a potentially embarrassing discussion of their fi ndings.
99 This implies that they should be most careful in suffi ciently justifying the application or, moreover, the non-application of any internationally mandatory rules which the parties have argued, since the clearer the reasoning of the award on this point, the less probable it is that a state court will review the details of the merits. 
